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šŸ“text•6 months ago

PR Merge Boundary Validation Runbook

Validate chained pull requests at each merge boundary with explicit checks, stale-approval handling, and rollback awareness.

devops
⭐1
# PR Merge Boundary Validation Runbook Imported from curated first-party documentation sources. ## What this covers Use this runbook when a merge sequence spans dependent pull requests and each boundary needs fresh validation. ## Use this when - Managing dependency-chained pull requests - Refreshing stale approvals near merge time - Reducing merge surprises through checkpoint validation ## Expected outcomes - Each merge boundary has a concrete verification step - Review freshness stays visible as branches evolve - Rollback planning is captured before the merge happens ## Source synthesis - EVOKORE-MCP/docs/PR_MERGE_RUNBOOK.md (https://github.com/mattmre/EVOKORE-MCP/blob/main/docs/PR_MERGE_RUNBOOK.md) ## Dedupe notes Keeps the merge-boundary validation concept separate from more general workflow or orchestration docs. ## Source excerpts ### EVOKORE-MCP/docs/PR_MERGE_RUNBOOK.md Operator runbook for reliable merges and context-rot prevention. ## Pre-merge Checklist - [ ] PR scope matches approved plan - [ ] PR description is filled using `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` - [ ] PR metadata automation check (`scripts/validate-pr-metadata.js`) is passing for pull_request CI runs - [ ] Required tests pass locally/CI - [ ] Docs updated for user-facing behavior changes - [ ] Release-impacting changes called out - [ ] Follow-up issues captured (if any) ## Required Checks by Change Type Use this as the minimum check set before approval and merge: | Change type | Required checks | | --- | --- | | Docs-only changes | `node test-docs-canonical-links.js` | | Ops/docs process changes (`docs/PR_MERGE_RUNBOOK.md`, `next-session.md`, orchestration docs) | `node test-ops-docs-validation.js` and `node test-docs-canonical-links.js` | | Source/tooling/config changes (`src/`, `scripts/`, workflow/config files) | Relevant targeted tests for touched area plus CI-required suite | | Release-flow changes | `node test-npm-release-flow-validation.js` plus docs/link checks | If a PR spans multiple change types, run the union of required checks. ## Reviewer Responsibilities - Confirm PR scope and dependency assumptions are explicit in description. - Confirm PR metadata fields from `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md` are complete. - Verify required checks for each change type are attached in PR evidence. - Block approval if dependency base PR is not merged or branch is stale. - Approve only the current chain head; do not pre-approve non-head dependent PRs. - Confirm all review conversations are resolved before final approval. - Ensure merge strategy and rollback notes are documented for risky changes. ## Merge Steps 1. Rebase or update branch with latest target branch. 2. Re-run required validations. 3. Confirm reviewer approvals and resolved conversations. 4. Merge via approved strategy. 5. Record merge commit/PR number in tracker. ## Merge-boundary Checkpoints At every dependency merge boundary (`base -> dependent`): 1. Rebase dependent PR branch on latest `main` immediately after parent merge. 2. Re-run required checks and attach updated evidence in PR metadata. 3. Revalidate approvals for the new head state (stale approvals must be refreshed). 4. Confirm merge-boundary revalidation notes are updated before merge. ## Merge-order Controls (Dependency Chain) 1. Define merge order explicitly in PR descriptions (`base -> dependent`). 2. Merge only the current chain head; hold dependents until parent merge is complete. 3. After each merge, rebase ...
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šŸ‘ļø0
docs
šŸ“text•6 months ago

Docker-Backed Jupyter Kernel Operator

Operate containerized Jupyter kernels with enablement, smoke checks, cleanup, and failure handling baked into the runbook.

devops
⭐1
# Docker-Backed Jupyter Kernel Operator Imported from curated first-party documentation sources. ## What this covers Use this runbook when you need isolated notebook execution, clear container lifecycle management, and troubleshooting guidance. ## Use this when - Enabling containerized notebook workflows - Cleaning up kernel containers safely - Troubleshooting notebook execution environments ## Expected outcomes - Kernel startup and cleanup steps are documented end-to-end - Failure modes are easier to diagnose - Notebook execution can be repeated without manual guesswork ## Source synthesis - AGENT33/docs/runbooks/jupyter-kernel-containers.md (https://github.com/mattmre/AGENT33/blob/main/docs/runbooks/jupyter-kernel-containers.md) ## Dedupe notes Uses the AGENT33 Jupyter container runbook as a focused operations import without duplicating broader walkthroughs. ## Source excerpts ### AGENT33/docs/runbooks/jupyter-kernel-containers.md ## Purpose Operate the Docker-backed Jupyter kernel adapter introduced for Phase 38 Stage 3 / Phase 42 follow-on work. ## Enablement Set: - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_ENABLED=true` - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_MODE=docker` Optional settings: - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_DOCKER_IMAGE` - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_ALLOWED_IMAGES` - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_NETWORK_ENABLED` - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_MOUNT_WORKDIR` - `JUPYTER_KERNEL_CONTAINER_WORKDIR` ## Operational Notes - Docker mode publishes kernel ports to the host and mounts a per-session runtime directory containing the Jupyter connection file. - When `JUPYTER_KERNEL_NETWORK_ENABLED=false`, the adapter starts containers with `--network none`. - Working-directory mounting is opt-in and should only point at paths already approved by workflow / execution policy. - The adapter enforces an image allowlist when one is configured. ## Failure Modes - `jupyter_client not installed`: install with `pip install agent33[jupyter]` - `docker executable not found`: install Docker and ensure `docker` is on `PATH` - `Docker image ... is not permitted`: align the requested image with `JUPYTER_KERNEL_ALLOWED_IMAGES` - kernel startup timeout: inspect Docker logs for the session container and verify the image includes `ipykernel` ## Cleanup - One-shot sessions are removed after execution. - Stateful sessions are removed explicitly or via adapter shutdown. - Forced cleanup uses `docker rm -f <container>` and deletes the runtime connection directory. ## Quick Smoke Workflow Register a minimal workflow that exercises the Docker-backed `code-interpreter` tool: ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/v1/workflows/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name": "docker-kernel-smoke", "version": "1.0.0", "description": "Validate Docker-backed Jupyter execution", "triggers": {"manual": true}, "inputs": {}, "outputs": { "result": {"type": "object"} }, "steps": [ { "id": "run-notebook-code", "action": "execute-code", "inputs": { "tool_id": "code-interpreter", "language": "python", "code": "print(6 * 7)" } } ], "execution": {"mode": "sequential"} }' ``` Then execute it: ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/v1/workflows/docker-kernel-smoke/execute \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"inputs": {}}' ```
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šŸ‘ļø0
docs
šŸ¤–system prompt•7 months ago

incident-runbook-templates

Create structured incident response runbooks with step-by-step

coding
⭐1
# Incident Runbook Templates Production-ready templates for incident response runbooks covering detection, triage, mitigation, resolution, and communication. ## When to Use This Skill - Creating incident response procedures - Building service-specific runbooks - Establishing escalation paths - Documenting recovery procedures - Responding to active incidents - Onboarding on-call engineers ## Core Concepts ### 1. Incident Severity Levels | Severity | Impact | Response Time | Example | | -------- | -------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------- | | **SEV1** | Complete outage, data loss | 15 min | Production down | | **SEV2** | Major degradation | 30 min | Critical feature broken | | **SEV3** | Minor impact | 2 hours | Non-critical bug | | **SEV4** | Minimal impact | Next business day | Cosmetic issue | ### 2. Runbook Structure ``` 1. Overview & Impact 2. Detection & Alerts 3. Initial Triage 4. Mitigation Steps 5. Root Cause Investigation 6. Resolution Procedures 7. Verification & Rollback 8. Communication Templates 9. Escalation Matrix ``` ## Runbook Templates ### Template 1: Service Outage Runbook ````markdown # [Service Name] Outage Runbook ## Overview **Service**: Payment Processing Service **Owner**: Platform Team **Slack**: #payments-incidents **PagerDuty**: payments-oncall ## Impact Assessment - [ ] Which customers are affected? - [ ] What percentage of traffic is impacted? - [ ] Are there financial implications? - [ ] What's the blast radius? ## Detection ### Alerts - `payment_error_rate > 5%` (PagerDuty) - `payment_latency_p99 > 2s` (Slack) - `payment_success_rate < 95%` (PagerDuty) ### Dashboards - [Payment Service Dashboard](https://grafana/d/payments) - [Error Tracking](https://sentry.io/payments) - [Dependency Status](https://status.stripe.com) ## Initial Triage (First 5 Minutes) ### 1. Assess Scope ```bash # Check service health kubectl get pods -n payments -l app=payment-service # Check recent deployments kubectl rollout history deployment/payment-service -n payments # Check error rates curl -s "http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query?query=sum(rate(http_requests_total{status=~'5..'}[5m]))" ``` ```` ### 2. Quick Health Checks - [ ] Can you reach the service? `curl -I https://api.company.com/payments/health` - [ ] Database connectivity? Check connection pool metrics - [ ] External dependencies? Check Stripe, bank API status - [ ] Recent changes? Check deploy history ### 3. Initial Classification | Symptom | Likely Cause | Go To Section | | -------------------- | ------------------- | ------------- | | All requests failing | Service down | Section 4.1 | | High latency | Database/dependency | Section 4.2 | | Partial failures | Code bug | Section 4.3 | | Spike in errors | Traffic surge | Section 4.4 | ## Mitigation Procedures ### 4.1 Service Completely Down ```bash # Step 1: Check pod status kubectl get pods -n payments # Step 2: If pods are crash-looping, check logs kubectl logs -n payments -l app=payment-service --tail=100 # Step 3: Check recent deployments kubectl rollout history deployment/payment-service -n payments # Step 4: ROLLBACK if recent deploy is suspect kubectl rollout undo deployment/payment-service -n payments # Step 5: Scale up if resource constrained kubectl scale deployment/payment-service -n payments --replicas=10 # Step 6: Verify recovery kubectl rollout status deployment/payment-service -n payments ``` ### 4.2 High Latency ```bash # Step 1: Check database connections kubectl exec -n payments deploy/payment-service -- \ curl localhost:8080/metrics | grep db_pool # Step 2: Check slow queries (if DB issue) psql -h $DB_HOST -U $DB_USER -c " SELECT pid, now() - query_start AS duration, query FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE state = 'active' AND duration > interval '5 seconds' ORDER BY duration DESC;" # Step 3: Kill long-running queries if needed psql -h $DB_HOST -U $DB_USER -c "SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid);" # Step 4: Check external dependency latency curl -w "@curl-format.txt" -o /dev/null -s https://api.stripe.com/v1/health # Step 5: Enable circuit breaker if dependency is slow kubectl set env deployment/payment-service \ STRIPE_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_ENABLED=true -n payments ``` ### 4.3 Partial Failures (Specific Errors) ```bash # Step 1: Identify error pattern kubectl logs -n payments -l app=payment-service --tail=500 | \ grep -i error | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -20 # Step 2: Check error tracking # Go to Sentry: https://sentry.io/payments # Step 3: If specific endpoint, enable feature flag to disable curl -X POST https://api.company.com/internal/feature-flags \ -d '{"flag": "DISABLE_PROBLEMATIC_FEATURE", "enabled": true}' # Step 4: If data issue, check recent data changes psql -h $DB_HOST -c " SELECT * FROM audit_log WHERE table_name = 'payment_methods' AND created_at > now() - interval '1 hour';" ``` ### 4.4 Traffic Surge ```bash # Step 1: Check current request rate kubectl top pods -n payments # Step 2: Scale horizontally kubectl scale deployment/payment-service -n payments --replicas=20 # Step 3: Enable rate limiting kubectl set env deployment/payment-service \ RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=true \ RATE_LIMIT_RPS=1000 -n payments # Step 4: If attack, block suspicious IPs kubectl apply -f - <<EOF apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: block-suspicious namespace: payments spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: payment-service ingress: - from: - ipBlock: cidr: 0.0.0.0/0 except: - 192.168.1.0/24 # Suspicious range EOF ``` ## Verification Steps ```bash # Verify service is healthy curl -s https://api.company.com/payments/health | jq # Verify error rate is back to normal curl -s "http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query?query=sum(rate(http_requests_total{status=~'5..'}[5m]))" | jq '.data.result[0].value[1]' # Verify latency is acceptable curl -s "http://prometheus:9090/api/v1/query?query=histogram_quantile(0.99,sum(rate(http_request_duration_seconds_bucket[5m]))by(le))" | jq # Smoke test critical flows ./scripts/smoke-test-payments.sh ``` ## Rollback Procedures ```bash # Rollback Kubernetes deployment kubectl rollout undo deployment/payment-service -n payments # Rollback database migration (if applicable) ./scripts/db-rollback.sh $MIGRATION_VERSION # Rollback feature flag curl -X POST https://api.company.com/internal/feature-flags \ -d '{"flag": "NEW_PAYMENT_FLOW", "enabled": false}' ``` ## Escalation Matrix | Condition | Escalate To | Contact | | ----------------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- | | > 15 min unresolved SEV1 | Engineering Manager | @manager (Slack) | | Data breach suspected | Security Team | #security-incidents | | Financial impact > $10k | Finance + Legal | @finance-oncall | | Customer communication needed | Support Lead | @support-lead | ## Communication Templates ### Initial Notification (Internal) ``` 🚨 INCIDENT: Payment Service Degradation Severity: SEV2 Status: Investigating Impact: ~20% of payment requests failing Start Time: [TIME] Incident Commander: [NAME] Current Actions: - Investigating root cause - Scaling up service - Monitoring dashboards Updates in #payments-incidents ``` ### Status Update ``` šŸ“Š UPDATE: Payment Service Incident Status: Mitigating Impact: Reduced to ~5% failure rate Duration: 25 minutes Actions Taken: - Rolled back deployment v2.3.4 → v2.3.3 - Scaled service from 5 → 10 replicas Next Steps: - Continuing to monitor - Root cause analysis in progress ETA to Resolution: ~15 minutes ``` ### Resolution Notification ``` āœ… RESOLVED: Payment Service Incident Duration: 45 minutes Impact: ~5,000 affected transactions Root Cause: Memory leak in v2.3.4 Resolution: - Rolled back to v2.3.3 - Transactions auto-retried successfully Follow-up: - Postmortem scheduled for [DATE] - Bug fix in progress ``` ```` ### Template 2: Database Incident Runbook ```markdown # Database Incident Runbook ## Quick Reference | Issue | Command | |-------|---------| | Check connections | `SELECT count(*) FROM pg_stat_activity;` | | Kill query | `SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid);` | | Check replication lag | `SELECT extract(epoch from (now() - pg_last_xact_replay_timestamp()));` | | Check locks | `SELECT * FROM pg_locks WHERE NOT granted;` | ## Connection Pool Exhaustion ```sql -- Check current connections SELECT datname, usename, state, count(*) FROM pg_stat_activity GROUP BY datname, usename, state ORDER BY count(*) DESC; -- Identify long-running connections SELECT pid, usename, datname, state, query_start, query FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE state != 'idle' ORDER BY query_start; -- Terminate idle connections SELECT pg_terminate_backend(pid) FROM pg_stat_activity WHERE state = 'idle' AND query_start < now() - interval '10 minutes'; ```` ## Replication Lag ```sql -- Check lag on replica SELECT CASE WHEN pg_last_wal_receive_lsn() = pg_last_wal_replay_lsn() THEN 0 ELSE extract(epoch from now() - pg_last_xact_replay_timestamp()) END AS lag_seconds; -- If lag > 60s, consider: -- 1. Check network between primary/replica -- 2. Check replica disk I/O -- 3. Consider failover if unrecoverable ``` ## Disk Space Critical ```bash # Check disk usage df -h /var/lib/postgresql/data # Find large tables psql -c "SELECT relname, pg_size_pretty(pg_total_relation_size(relid)) FROM pg_catalog.pg_statio_user_tables ORDER BY pg_total_relation_size(relid) DESC LIMIT 10;" # VACUUM to reclaim space psql -c "VACUUM FULL large_table;" # If emergency, delete old data or expand disk ``` ``` ## Best Practices ### Do's - **Keep runbooks updated** - Review after every incident - **Test runbooks regularly** - Game days, chaos engineering - **Include rollback steps** - Always have an escape hatch - **Document assumptions** - What must be true for steps to work - **Link to dashboards** - Quick access during stress ### Don'ts - **Don't assume knowledge** - Write for 3 AM brain - **Don't skip verification** - Confirm each step worked - **Don't forget communication** - Keep stakeholders informed - **Don't work alone** - Escalate early - **Don't skip postmortems** - Learn from every incident ## Resources - [Google SRE Book - Incident Management](https://sre.google/sre-book/managing-incidents/) - [PagerDuty Incident Response](https://response.pagerduty.com/) - [Atlassian Incident Management](https://www.atlassian.com/incident-management) ```
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šŸ‘ļø0
šŸ¤– Auto-discovered
šŸ¤–system prompt•7 months ago

on-call-handoff-patterns

Master on-call shift handoffs with context transfer, escalation

coding
⭐1
# On-Call Handoff Patterns Effective patterns for on-call shift transitions, ensuring continuity, context transfer, and reliable incident response across shifts. ## When to Use This Skill - Transitioning on-call responsibilities - Writing shift handoff summaries - Documenting ongoing investigations - Establishing on-call rotation procedures - Improving handoff quality - Onboarding new on-call engineers ## Core Concepts ### 1. Handoff Components | Component | Purpose | | -------------------------- | ----------------------- | | **Active Incidents** | What's currently broken | | **Ongoing Investigations** | Issues being debugged | | **Recent Changes** | Deployments, configs | | **Known Issues** | Workarounds in place | | **Upcoming Events** | Maintenance, releases | ### 2. Handoff Timing ``` Recommended: 30 min overlap between shifts Outgoing: ā”œā”€ā”€ 15 min: Write handoff document └── 15 min: Sync call with incoming Incoming: ā”œā”€ā”€ 15 min: Review handoff document ā”œā”€ā”€ 15 min: Sync call with outgoing └── 5 min: Verify alerting setup ``` ## Templates ### Template 1: Shift Handoff Document ````markdown # On-Call Handoff: Platform Team **Outgoing**: @alice (2024-01-15 to 2024-01-22) **Incoming**: @bob (2024-01-22 to 2024-01-29) **Handoff Time**: 2024-01-22 09:00 UTC --- ## šŸ”“ Active Incidents ### None currently active No active incidents at handoff time. --- ## 🟔 Ongoing Investigations ### 1. Intermittent API Timeouts (ENG-1234) **Status**: Investigating **Started**: 2024-01-20 **Impact**: ~0.1% of requests timing out **Context**: - Timeouts correlate with database backup window (02:00-03:00 UTC) - Suspect backup process causing lock contention - Added extra logging in PR #567 (deployed 01/21) **Next Steps**: - [ ] Review new logs after tonight's backup - [ ] Consider moving backup window if confirmed **Resources**: - Dashboard: [API Latency](https://grafana/d/api-latency) - Thread: #platform-eng (01/20, 14:32) --- ### 2. Memory Growth in Auth Service (ENG-1235) **Status**: Monitoring **Started**: 2024-01-18 **Impact**: None yet (proactive) **Context**: - Memory usage growing ~5% per day - No memory leak found in profiling - Suspect connection pool not releasing properly **Next Steps**: - [ ] Review heap dump from 01/21 - [ ] Consider restart if usage > 80% **Resources**: - Dashboard: [Auth Service Memory](https://grafana/d/auth-memory) - Analysis doc: [Memory Investigation](https://docs/eng-1235) --- ## 🟢 Resolved This Shift ### Payment Service Outage (2024-01-19) - **Duration**: 23 minutes - **Root Cause**: Database connection exhaustion - **Resolution**: Rolled back v2.3.4, increased pool size - **Postmortem**: [POSTMORTEM-89](https://docs/postmortem-89) - **Follow-up tickets**: ENG-1230, ENG-1231 --- ## šŸ“‹ Recent Changes ### Deployments | Service | Version | Time | Notes | | ------------ | ------- | ----------- | -------------------------- | | api-gateway | v3.2.1 | 01/21 14:00 | Bug fix for header parsing | | user-service | v2.8.0 | 01/20 10:00 | New profile features | | auth-service | v4.1.2 | 01/19 16:00 | Security patch | ### Configuration Changes - 01/21: Increased API rate limit from 1000 to 1500 RPS - 01/20: Updated database connection pool max from 50 to 75 ### Infrastructure - 01/20: Added 2 nodes to Kubernetes cluster - 01/19: Upgraded Redis from 6.2 to 7.0 --- ## āš ļø Known Issues & Workarounds ### 1. Slow Dashboard Loading **Issue**: Grafana dashboards slow on Monday mornings **Workaround**: Wait 5 min after 08:00 UTC for cache warm-up **Ticket**: OPS-456 (P3) ### 2. Flaky Integration Test **Issue**: `test_payment_flow` fails intermittently in CI **Workaround**: Re-run failed job (usually passes on retry) **Ticket**: ENG-1200 (P2) --- ## šŸ“… Upcoming Events | Date | Event | Impact | Contact | | ----------- | -------------------- | ------------------- | ------------- | | 01/23 02:00 | Database maintenance | 5 min read-only | @dba-team | | 01/24 14:00 | Major release v5.0 | Monitor closely | @release-team | | 01/25 | Marketing campaign | 2x traffic expected | @platform | --- ## šŸ“ž Escalation Reminders | Issue Type | First Escalation | Second Escalation | | --------------- | -------------------- | ----------------- | | Payment issues | @payments-oncall | @payments-manager | | Auth issues | @auth-oncall | @security-team | | Database issues | @dba-team | @infra-manager | | Unknown/severe | @engineering-manager | @vp-engineering | --- ## šŸ”§ Quick Reference ### Common Commands ```bash # Check service health kubectl get pods -A | grep -v Running # Recent deployments kubectl get events --sort-by='.lastTimestamp' | tail -20 # Database connections psql -c "SELECT count(*) FROM pg_stat_activity;" # Clear cache (emergency only) redis-cli FLUSHDB ``` ```` ### Important Links - [Runbooks](https://wiki/runbooks) - [Service Catalog](https://wiki/services) - [Incident Slack](https://slack.com/incidents) - [PagerDuty](https://pagerduty.com/schedules) --- ## Handoff Checklist ### Outgoing Engineer - [x] Document active incidents - [x] Document ongoing investigations - [x] List recent changes - [x] Note known issues - [x] Add upcoming events - [x] Sync with incoming engineer ### Incoming Engineer - [ ] Read this document - [ ] Join sync call - [ ] Verify PagerDuty is routing to you - [ ] Verify Slack notifications working - [ ] Check VPN/access working - [ ] Review critical dashboards ```` ### Template 2: Quick Handoff (Async) ```markdown # Quick Handoff: @alice → @bob ## TL;DR - No active incidents - 1 investigation ongoing (API timeouts, see ENG-1234) - Major release tomorrow (01/24) - be ready for issues ## Watch List 1. API latency around 02:00-03:00 UTC (backup window) 2. Auth service memory (restart if > 80%) ## Recent - Deployed api-gateway v3.2.1 yesterday (stable) - Increased rate limits to 1500 RPS ## Coming Up - 01/23 02:00 - DB maintenance (5 min read-only) - 01/24 14:00 - v5.0 release ## Questions? I'll be available on Slack until 17:00 today. ```` ### Template 3: Incident Handoff (Mid-Incident) ```markdown # INCIDENT HANDOFF: Payment Service Degradation **Incident Start**: 2024-01-22 08:15 UTC **Current Status**: Mitigating **Severity**: SEV2 --- ## Current State - Error rate: 15% (down from 40%) - Mitigation in progress: scaling up pods - ETA to resolution: ~30 min ## What We Know 1. Root cause: Memory pressure on payment-service pods 2. Triggered by: Unusual traffic spike (3x normal) 3. Contributing: Inefficient query in checkout flow ## What We've Done - Scaled payment-service from 5 → 15 pods - Enabled rate limiting on checkout endpoint - Disabled non-critical features ## What Needs to Happen 1. Monitor error rate - should reach <1% in ~15 min 2. If not improving, escalate to @payments-manager 3. Once stable, begin root cause investigation ## Key People - Incident Commander: @alice (handing off) - Comms Lead: @charlie - Technical Lead: @bob (incoming) ## Communication - Status page: Updated at 08:45 - Customer support: Notified - Exec team: Aware ## Resources - Incident channel: #inc-20240122-payment - Dashboard: [Payment Service](https://grafana/d/payments) - Runbook: [Payment Degradation](https://wiki/runbooks/payments) --- **Incoming on-call (@bob) - Please confirm you have:** - [ ] Joined #inc-20240122-payment - [ ] Access to dashboards - [ ] Understand current state - [ ] Know escalation path ``` ## Handoff Sync Meeting ### Agenda (15 minutes) ```markdown ## Handoff Sync: @alice → @bob 1. **Active Issues** (5 min) - Walk through any ongoing incidents - Discuss investigation status - Transfer context and theories 2. **Recent Changes** (3 min) - Deployments to watch - Config changes - Known regressions 3. **Upcoming Events** (3 min) - Maintenance windows - Expected traffic changes - Releases planned 4. **Questions** (4 min) - Clarify anything unclear - Confirm access and alerting - Exchange contact info ``` ## On-Call Best Practices ### Before Your Shift ```markdown ## Pre-Shift Checklist ### Access Verification - [ ] VPN working - [ ] kubectl access to all clusters - [ ] Database read access - [ ] Log aggregator access (Splunk/Datadog) - [ ] PagerDuty app installed and logged in ### Alerting Setup - [ ] PagerDuty schedule shows you as primary - [ ] Phone notifications enabled - [ ] Slack notifications for incident channels - [ ] Test alert received and acknowledged ### Knowledge Refresh - [ ] Review recent incidents (past 2 weeks) - [ ] Check service changelog - [ ] Skim critical runbooks - [ ] Know escalation contacts ### Environment Ready - [ ] Laptop charged and accessible - [ ] Phone charged - [ ] Quiet space available for calls - [ ] Secondary contact identified (if traveling) ``` ### During Your Shift ```markdown ## Daily On-Call Routine ### Morning (start of day) - [ ] Check overnight alerts - [ ] Review dashboards for anomalies - [ ] Check for any P0/P1 tickets created - [ ] Skim incident channels for context ### Throughout Day - [ ] Respond to alerts within SLA - [ ] Document investigation progress - [ ] Update team on significant issues - [ ] Triage incoming pages ### End of Day - [ ] Hand off any active issues - [ ] Update investigation docs - [ ] Note anything for next shift ``` ### After Your Shift ```markdown ## Post-Shift Checklist - [ ] Complete handoff document - [ ] Sync with incoming on-call - [ ] Verify PagerDuty routing changed - [ ] Close/update investigation tickets - [ ] File postmortems for any incidents - [ ] Take time off if shift was stressful ``` ## Escalation Guidelines ### When to Escalate ```markdown ## Escalation Triggers ### Immediate Escalation - SEV1 incident declared - Data breach suspected - Unable to diagnose within 30 min - Customer or legal escalation received ### Consider Escalation - Issue spans multiple teams - Requires expertise you don't have - Business impact exceeds threshold - You're uncertain about next steps ### How to Escalate 1. Page the appropriate escalation path 2. Provide brief context in Slack 3. Stay engaged until escalation acknowledges 4. Hand off cleanly, don't just disappear ``` ## Best Practices ### Do's - **Document everything** - Future you will thank you - **Escalate early** - Better safe than sorry - **Take breaks** - Alert fatigue is real - **Keep handoffs synchronous** - Async loses context - **Test your setup** - Before incidents, not during ### Don'ts - **Don't skip handoffs** - Context loss causes incidents - **Don't hero** - Escalate when needed - **Don't ignore alerts** - Even if they seem minor - **Don't work sick** - Swap shifts instead - **Don't disappear** - Stay reachable during shift ## Resources - [Google SRE - Being On-Call](https://sre.google/sre-book/being-on-call/) - [PagerDuty On-Call Guide](https://www.pagerduty.com/resources/learn/on-call-management/) - [Increment On-Call Issue](https://increment.com/on-call/)
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šŸ‘ļø0
šŸ¤– Auto-discovered
šŸ¤–system prompt•7 months ago

postmortem-writing

Write effective blameless postmortems with root cause analysis,

coding
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# Postmortem Writing Comprehensive guide to writing effective, blameless postmortems that drive organizational learning and prevent incident recurrence. ## When to Use This Skill - Conducting post-incident reviews - Writing postmortem documents - Facilitating blameless postmortem meetings - Identifying root causes and contributing factors - Creating actionable follow-up items - Building organizational learning culture ## Core Concepts ### 1. Blameless Culture | Blame-Focused | Blameless | | ------------------------ | --------------------------------- | | "Who caused this?" | "What conditions allowed this?" | | "Someone made a mistake" | "The system allowed this mistake" | | Punish individuals | Improve systems | | Hide information | Share learnings | | Fear of speaking up | Psychological safety | ### 2. Postmortem Triggers - SEV1 or SEV2 incidents - Customer-facing outages > 15 minutes - Data loss or security incidents - Near-misses that could have been severe - Novel failure modes - Incidents requiring unusual intervention ## Quick Start ### Postmortem Timeline ``` Day 0: Incident occurs Day 1-2: Draft postmortem document Day 3-5: Postmortem meeting Day 5-7: Finalize document, create tickets Week 2+: Action item completion Quarterly: Review patterns across incidents ``` ## Templates ### Template 1: Standard Postmortem ```markdown # Postmortem: [Incident Title] **Date**: 2024-01-15 **Authors**: @alice, @bob **Status**: Draft | In Review | Final **Incident Severity**: SEV2 **Incident Duration**: 47 minutes ## Executive Summary On January 15, 2024, the payment processing service experienced a 47-minute outage affecting approximately 12,000 customers. The root cause was a database connection pool exhaustion triggered by a configuration change in deployment v2.3.4. The incident was resolved by rolling back to v2.3.3 and increasing connection pool limits. **Impact**: - 12,000 customers unable to complete purchases - Estimated revenue loss: $45,000 - 847 support tickets created - No data loss or security implications ## Timeline (All times UTC) | Time | Event | | ----- | ----------------------------------------------- | | 14:23 | Deployment v2.3.4 completed to production | | 14:31 | First alert: `payment_error_rate > 5%` | | 14:33 | On-call engineer @alice acknowledges alert | | 14:35 | Initial investigation begins, error rate at 23% | | 14:41 | Incident declared SEV2, @bob joins | | 14:45 | Database connection exhaustion identified | | 14:52 | Decision to rollback deployment | | 14:58 | Rollback to v2.3.3 initiated | | 15:10 | Rollback complete, error rate dropping | | 15:18 | Service fully recovered, incident resolved | ## Root Cause Analysis ### What Happened The v2.3.4 deployment included a change to the database query pattern that inadvertently removed connection pooling for a frequently-called endpoint. Each request opened a new database connection instead of reusing pooled connections. ### Why It Happened 1. **Proximate Cause**: Code change in `PaymentRepository.java` replaced pooled `DataSource` with direct `DriverManager.getConnection()` calls. 2. **Contributing Factors**: - Code review did not catch the connection handling change - No integration tests specifically for connection pool behavior - Staging environment has lower traffic, masking the issue - Database connection metrics alert threshold was too high (90%) 3. **5 Whys Analysis**: - Why did the service fail? → Database connections exhausted - Why were connections exhausted? → Each request opened new connection - Why did each request open new connection? → Code bypassed connection pool - Why did code bypass connection pool? → Developer unfamiliar with codebase patterns - Why was developer unfamiliar? → No documentation on connection management patterns ### System Diagram ``` [Client] → [Load Balancer] → [Payment Service] → [Database] ↓ Connection Pool (broken) ↓ Direct connections (cause) ``` ## Detection ### What Worked - Error rate alert fired within 8 minutes of deployment - Grafana dashboard clearly showed connection spike - On-call response was swift (2 minute acknowledgment) ### What Didn't Work - Database connection metric alert threshold too high - No deployment-correlated alerting - Canary deployment would have caught this earlier ### Detection Gap The deployment completed at 14:23, but the first alert didn't fire until 14:31 (8 minutes). A deployment-aware alert could have detected the issue faster. ## Response ### What Worked - On-call engineer quickly identified database as the issue - Rollback decision was made decisively - Clear communication in incident channel ### What Could Be Improved - Took 10 minutes to correlate issue with recent deployment - Had to manually check deployment history - Rollback took 12 minutes (could be faster) ## Impact ### Customer Impact - 12,000 unique customers affected - Average impact duration: 35 minutes - 847 support tickets (23% of affected users) - Customer satisfaction score dropped 12 points ### Business Impact - Estimated revenue loss: $45,000 - Support cost: ~$2,500 (agent time) - Engineering time: ~8 person-hours ### Technical Impact - Database primary experienced elevated load - Some replica lag during incident - No permanent damage to systems ## Lessons Learned ### What Went Well 1. Alerting detected the issue before customer reports 2. Team collaborated effectively under pressure 3. Rollback procedure worked smoothly 4. Communication was clear and timely ### What Went Wrong 1. Code review missed critical change 2. Test coverage gap for connection pooling 3. Staging environment doesn't reflect production traffic 4. Alert thresholds were not tuned properly ### Where We Got Lucky 1. Incident occurred during business hours with full team available 2. Database handled the load without failing completely 3. No other incidents occurred simultaneously ## Action Items | Priority | Action | Owner | Due Date | Ticket | |----------|--------|-------|----------|--------| | P0 | Add integration test for connection pool behavior | @alice | 2024-01-22 | ENG-1234 | | P0 | Lower database connection alert threshold to 70% | @bob | 2024-01-17 | OPS-567 | | P1 | Document connection management patterns | @alice | 2024-01-29 | DOC-89 | | P1 | Implement deployment-correlated alerting | @bob | 2024-02-05 | OPS-568 | | P2 | Evaluate canary deployment strategy | @charlie | 2024-02-15 | ENG-1235 | | P2 | Load test staging with production-like traffic | @dave | 2024-02-28 | QA-123 | ## Appendix ### Supporting Data #### Error Rate Graph [Link to Grafana dashboard snapshot] #### Database Connection Graph [Link to metrics] ### Related Incidents - 2023-11-02: Similar connection issue in User Service (POSTMORTEM-42) ### References - [Connection Pool Best Practices](internal-wiki/connection-pools) - [Deployment Runbook](internal-wiki/deployment-runbook) ``` ### Template 2: 5 Whys Analysis ```markdown # 5 Whys Analysis: [Incident] ## Problem Statement Payment service experienced 47-minute outage due to database connection exhaustion. ## Analysis ### Why #1: Why did the service fail? **Answer**: Database connections were exhausted, causing all new requests to fail. **Evidence**: Metrics showed connection count at 100/100 (max), with 500+ pending requests. --- ### Why #2: Why were database connections exhausted? **Answer**: Each incoming request opened a new database connection instead of using the connection pool. **Evidence**: Code diff shows direct `DriverManager.getConnection()` instead of pooled `DataSource`. --- ### Why #3: Why did the code bypass the connection pool? **Answer**: A developer refactored the repository class and inadvertently changed the connection acquisition method. **Evidence**: PR #1234 shows the change, made while fixing a different bug. --- ### Why #4: Why wasn't this caught in code review? **Answer**: The reviewer focused on the functional change (the bug fix) and didn't notice the infrastructure change. **Evidence**: Review comments only discuss business logic. --- ### Why #5: Why isn't there a safety net for this type of change? **Answer**: We lack automated tests that verify connection pool behavior and lack documentation about our connection patterns. **Evidence**: Test suite has no tests for connection handling; wiki has no article on database connections. ## Root Causes Identified 1. **Primary**: Missing automated tests for infrastructure behavior 2. **Secondary**: Insufficient documentation of architectural patterns 3. **Tertiary**: Code review checklist doesn't include infrastructure considerations ## Systemic Improvements | Root Cause | Improvement | Type | | ------------- | --------------------------------- | ---------- | | Missing tests | Add infrastructure behavior tests | Prevention | | Missing docs | Document connection patterns | Prevention | | Review gaps | Update review checklist | Detection | | No canary | Implement canary deployments | Mitigation | ``` ### Template 3: Quick Postmortem (Minor Incidents) ```markdown # Quick Postmortem: [Brief Title] **Date**: 2024-01-15 | **Duration**: 12 min | **Severity**: SEV3 ## What Happened API latency spiked to 5s due to cache miss storm after cache flush. ## Timeline - 10:00 - Cache flush initiated for config update - 10:02 - Latency alerts fire - 10:05 - Identified as cache miss storm - 10:08 - Enabled cache warming - 10:12 - Latency normalized ## Root Cause Full cache flush for minor config update caused thundering herd. ## Fix - Immediate: Enabled cache warming - Long-term: Implement partial cache invalidation (ENG-999) ## Lessons Don't full-flush cache in production; use targeted invalidation. ``` ## Facilitation Guide ### Running a Postmortem Meeting ```markdown ## Meeting Structure (60 minutes) ### 1. Opening (5 min) - Remind everyone of blameless culture - "We're here to learn, not to blame" - Review meeting norms ### 2. Timeline Review (15 min) - Walk through events chronologically - Ask clarifying questions - Identify gaps in timeline ### 3. Analysis Discussion (20 min) - What failed? - Why did it fail? - What conditions allowed this? - What would have prevented it? ### 4. Action Items (15 min) - Brainstorm improvements - Prioritize by impact and effort - Assign owners and due dates ### 5. Closing (5 min) - Summarize key learnings - Confirm action item owners - Schedule follow-up if needed ## Facilitation Tips - Keep discussion on track - Redirect blame to systems - Encourage quiet participants - Document dissenting views - Time-box tangents ``` ## Anti-Patterns to Avoid | Anti-Pattern | Problem | Better Approach | | ----------------------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------- | | **Blame game** | Shuts down learning | Focus on systems | | **Shallow analysis** | Doesn't prevent recurrence | Ask "why" 5 times | | **No action items** | Waste of time | Always have concrete next steps | | **Unrealistic actions** | Never completed | Scope to achievable tasks | | **No follow-up** | Actions forgotten | Track in ticketing system | ## Best Practices ### Do's - **Start immediately** - Memory fades fast - **Be specific** - Exact times, exact errors - **Include graphs** - Visual evidence - **Assign owners** - No orphan action items - **Share widely** - Organizational learning ### Don'ts - **Don't name and shame** - Ever - **Don't skip small incidents** - They reveal patterns - **Don't make it a blame doc** - That kills learning - **Don't create busywork** - Actions should be meaningful - **Don't skip follow-up** - Verify actions completed ## Resources - [Google SRE - Postmortem Culture](https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/) - [Etsy's Blameless Postmortems](https://codeascraft.com/2012/05/22/blameless-postmortems/) - [PagerDuty Postmortem Guide](https://postmortems.pagerduty.com/)
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